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I. INTRODUCTION 
Posner (1975) made a significant contribution to the theory 
of regulation by pointing out that the existence of an opportunity 
to obtain monopoly profits will attract resources into efforts 
to obtain monopolies, and the opportunity costs of those resources 
are social costs of monopoly too. This general insight is undoubtedly 
true and is very useful in analyzing seemingly diverse types of 
behavior. In the process of such analysis several specific technical 
questions arise very naturally; Posner speculates on their answers 
but does not prove his assertions. The purpose of this paper is 
to explicitly address these unanswered questions. In general we 
wish to predict the behavior we would observe when a number of 
different firms compete for the right to earn a monopoly profit 
by receiving some sort of franchise. Would they spend more or 
less than the total potential monopoly profit? Posner speculates 
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77-80573 to Robert H. Bates and Canada Council Doctoral Fellowship 
Num�er 452-793798 while writing this paper. I would like to thank 
James S. Jordan, Roger Noll, Jennifer Reinganum, and Louis Wilde for 
helpful comments. 
that they would collectively spend precisely the potential profit. 
If ten firms are vying for a monopoly having a present value of 
$1 million, and each of them has an equal chance of obtaining 
it and is risk neutral, each will spend $100,000 (assuming 
constant costs) on trying to obtain the monopoly. Only one 
will succeed and his costs will be much smaller than the 
monopoly profits, but the total costs of obtaining the 
monopoly--counting losers' expenditures as well as winners-­
will be the same as under certainty.
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How would this situation change if the current monopolist were to 
have an advantage over potential entrants at regulatory hearings 
to (possibly) reassign the franchise? Would firms collectively 
spend more or less? Would the current monopolist outspend or 
underspend the potential entrants? Posner speculates that the 
tendency for entrants to spend less because of their lower chances 
would be counteracted by their desire to spend more because owning 
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the monopoly is now worth more, and tha� therefore, a situation where 
the current monopolist has an advantage should not be any different. 
Technical analysis shows Posner's assertion that total 
expenditures of competing firms equals the franchise profit to 
be less general than he claimed. It is critical that we additionally 
assume that competitive pressures of some sort (such as entry) 
drive the value of the game for all firms to zero. In this case 
the long-run expected expenditures of firms will equal the franchise 
profit. However, expenditures may exceed, equal, or fall short of the 
1 
Posner (1975) p. 812 
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franchise profit in any given period. If in addition, firms are 
identical and in a symmetric equilibrium, combined expenditures of 
firms will be precisely the franchise prof�t every period. Without the 
assumption that all values are zero, we can only say that the long-run 
expected expenditures of firms will not exceed the franchise profit. 
A s  before, expenditures may exceed, equal, or fall short of the 
franchise profit in any given period. For the case of identical firms 
in a symmetric equilibrium, we can prove that combined expenditures on 
the part of entrants will never exceed the franchise profit in any period. 
In a more specific model where entrants are identical 
and risk neutral and a Nash equilibrium concept is used, it is possible 
to prove that differing degrees of advantage conferred upon the 
current monopolist result in differing behavior on the part of the 
participating firms and in differing aggregate expenditures. An 
increased advantage to the current monopolist tends to decrease 
aggregate expenditures if firms discount future profits highly, 
if there are many potential entrants, or if the current monopolist's 
advantage is already quite high. On the other hand, an increased 
advantage to the current monopolist tends to increase aggregate 
expenditures if firms discount future profits very little, if there 
are few potential entrants, or if the current monopolist's advantage 
is already quite low. 
Furthermore, in this model, an increase in the competitive 
pressures in the form of an increased number of potential entrants 
does not drive the aggregate value of the game to zero even in the 
limit. Therefore, combined expenditures remain a discrete distance 
below the franchise profit even in the limit. This tendency becomes 
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more pronounced as the advantage to the monopolist is increased. A t  
least in some cases, therefore, we would never expect combined 
expenditures by firms to equal the franchise profit. 
II. THE GENERAL CA SE
We wish to model the idealized situation where n firms
compete for the right to operate a monopoly franchise which generates 
profits. A t  the start of each period, a government agency assigns 
rights to the franchise for that period. Firms spend money attempting 
to influence this decision. 
Formally, we construct an n-person infinite period game. 
There are n states; let state j be the state where firm j is currently 
the monopolist. Let x . . be the amount of money spent by firm i when1] 
state j occurs. The state space and firms' strageties are stationary. 
They are not dependent on t. A firm's probability of obtaining the 
franchise clearly will depend upon its and others' lobbying expenditures. 
It may also depend upon what state the world is in. For example, a 
firm's chances of success may be greater if it is the monopolist 
because it now has greater knowledge and expertise or because it has 
established a relationship with its regulators. Let fij 
be the 
probability of firm i succeeding in state j; f .. is a function o f1] 
(x1., . • •  ,x .). It must be true for every (x1., . • •  ,x . ) that J n] J n] 
n 
I: f . . = 1 'tj j 
i=l 1] 
fij > 0 'tj i,j. 
(1) 
(2) 
5 
Let � be the prof its that the successful firm earns in a period by 
operating the franchise. 
Firm i selects the strategy' vector Cxf1, • • •  , x�n). That is, 
firm i spends x�. if state j occurs. Let 8 .. be firm i's probability1] 1] 
of success in state j with the given strategies: 
eij fij Cxfj, x�j, • . •  , x�j) 
Let e be the matrix with Ci, j) entry of e . . •1] 
e [8ij l 
(3) 
(4) 
By (1) and (2) 8 is a stochastic matrix. The associated stochastic 
process is the one that determines which firm will be the monopolist 
for each period. 
Such a matrix always has a steady state solution--a 
vector y = [y1 , • • •  ,yn] such that 
(i) y. < 0 1- 'tj i =l,
n 
(ii) I: Y. = 1 
i=l 1 
(iii) Y = ey 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
The steady state may not be unique; as well, the stochastic process 
may actually converge to some sort of cycle. However, at a minimum, 
the average of the cycle which the stochastic process converges to 
equals one of the steady states. Therefore, one of the steady states 
describes the long-run average probability distribution which the 
stochastic process will exhibit. (Which steady state does this 
depends on the initial point.) Long-run expected values for this 
process are therefore calculated by using one of the steady state 
distributions . .  See Gantmacher (1960) for a complete discussion 
of these points. 
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Before stating and proving the major theorem of this section, 
more notation needs to be introduced. Let e�.  be the probability of lJ 
firm i becoming the monopolist in period t given that firm j is 
currently the monopolist. That is, e�j is the (i,j) entry of e
t. 
Let R�j be the expected profit to firm i in period t given that the 
world is currently in state j. These returns can be defined 
recursively as follows: 
1 Rij = eij'JT - xfj 
t 
n t-1 1 Ri. = L: 6kj R.k J k=l l 
t = 2,3, . . •
I will assume that all firms calculate the value of the game by 
(8) 
(9) 
summing discounted expected profits, firm i using the discount rate 
Ci. Let V . . be the value of the game to firm i in the state j. lJ 
vij 
00 
L: c�-lRt 
t=l l ij 
(10) 
Finally, let S. be the surplus of 'IT over total firm expenditures which J 
occurs in state j. 
sj 'JT -
n 
L: x * 
i=l ij 
The major theorem of this section is that the long-run 
(ll) 
expected surplus that this game generates is a nonnegative weighted 
sum of the values {V . . }. l] 
Theorem 1: 
Proof: 
Let y be a steady state solution to 6. Then 
n 
L: y.S 
j= l J j 
n n 
L: L: y.(l - c.)V . .
i=l j=l J l lJ 
(12) 
See A ppendix o 
The value of the game to every player must always be nonnegative 
if we assume that the strategy of doing nothing at zero cost is 
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available to each player. Therefore, the RHS of (12) is nonnegative; 
therefore, so is the LHS. Therefore, the long-run expected surplus 
of 'IT over total expenditures is nonnegative. However, the surplus 
in any particular state could be negative. That is, in the general 
case we cannot predict anything about the surplus in any particular 
period; we can only predict that in the long run the average surplus 
will be nonnegative. Suppose, however, that the surplus generated 
was the same in every state. (This would occur, for example, 
in a symmetric equilibrium of identical firms. ) Then the surplus 
every period would be nonnegative. -
Finally, consider the case where the value of the game is 
zero for every player in every state. This might occur, for example, 
if there were many firms of each type and entry occurred. Then 
the firms collectively spend on average TI. If there is a symmetric 
equilibrium of identical firms they would then spend precisely TI 
every period in accord with Posner's prediction. 
III. A SPECIAL CASE
We can make a surprising number of predictions about the 
general case where all firms have different return functions, 
use different discount rates and no equilibrium concept is specified. 
However, the problem of identifying the effects of increasing the 
current monopolist's advantage is not tractable in such a setting. 
This problem does become tractable in the specific setting which is 
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presented in this section. As well the model of this section provides 
a useful concrete example of the propositions proved for the more 
abstract model. 
For expositional convenience assume that there are n + 1 
firms (instead of r) , 1 current monopolist and n potential entrants. 
Let f ij 
be given by
and by 
f . .  (0, ... ,0) 
l.J 
0 (13-a) 
13¥;ij 
' i = j 13 + E �· xjj kfj J 
) = 
� xij " i f j 
fij (xlj ' • · • 
,xn +l,j 
6+ E �· xjj kfj J 
for every (x1., • . •  ,x +l . ) f 0, J n ,J 
where 13 is some real number greater than or equal to 1. Each 
firm' s chance of obtaining the franchise is simply the proportion 
of total lobbying expenditures that it accounts for weighted by 
an advantage for the current monopolist. All potential entrants 
are treated the same. Each firm faces the same return function 
if it becomes the monopolist. This is, therefore, in some sense 
the simplest specification of a case where the monopolist has 
an advantage. A s  well, assume that each firm uses the same 
discount rate, c. 
We will use the Nash equilibrium concept. 
Definition: 
The strategy vectors {xf, . • .  ,x�+l} are equilibrium 
strategies if for every i and j, xf satisfies 
Vij
Cxf·····xt·····x�+l) sup V .. (x1
*, • . .  ,x., • . .  ,x *+l) 
n+l l.J 1 n Xi ER+ 
9 
(13-b) 
(14) 
That is, x� must maximize (V.1, ... ,V. +l) given others' behavior. 1 i i,n 
Note that the domain of x. is Rn
+l (where R+ = [o,oo)). In particular, ]. + 
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the firm always has the option of doing nothing at zero cost and zero 
return. Recall from (13) that our return functions are particularly 
simple--a firm's probability of winning is not affected by which 
of the others is the monopolist so long as they all spend the same. 
Because of this we might hope for a particularly simple sort of 
equilibrium to occur; each firm' s strategy is one number, xe, if it is 
an entrant and another number, xm, if it is the monopolist. We 
will call this a symmetric equilibrium. 
Definition: 
An equilibrium {xf }��i is a symmetric equilibrium if there 
exist two numbers xe and xm such that for every i and j 
x * ij
i f. j { x ' 
x:, i j 
The major result of this section is the constructive proof of the 
existence and uniqueness of such a symmetric equilibrium. Since 
each player has the same strategy and it only varies as he is the 
entrant or monopolist, it will be seen that all of the variables 
indexed by (i,j) will only assume two values. We will employ the 
notational convenience of indexing them by "e" and "m" for the 
state of being the entrant or being the monopolist. 
Theorem 2: 
(15) 
Theorem 2: 
x e 
The unique symmetric equilibrium is 
Smr 
2 2 2 (Sn + 1) - en CS - 1) - 2cn(S -1) 
x m 
[ n - 1) n - -S-- xe. 
Other variables assume the following values (uniquely): 
8 1 e 
= 
Sn + 1 
8 = Sn + 1 - n m Sn + 1 
Rl = __ 11_ - x e Sn + 1 e 
Rl = 1 (Sn + 1 - n) _ x m Sn + 1 m 
V = � Rl + (1 - c) + en 8e Rl e D m D e 
V = (1 - c) + c 8e R
l 
+ en 8e R
l 
m D m D e 
where 
D = (1 - c){(l - c) + c 8e(l + n)} 
Proof: 
See Appendix 
Before discussing the substantive qualties of the 
model one comment on uniqueness is in order. For the case where 
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(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
D 
c = 0, that is where the world ends after the first period, the 
symmetric equilibrium is in fact the unique equilibrium. Therefore, 
although I was unable to prove that the symmetric equilibrium is 
the unique equilibrium for the general case, my solution is a 
generalization of the unique solution for the one period case. 
It is interesting to note that although Ve and V m 
are always 
positive, R1 may be negative. (R1 must always be positive.) That is, 
e m 
entrants may play the game expecting to make a short-run loss and recoup 
it in the future by becoming the monopolist. Note also that V and V e m 
12 
are convex combinations of R1/(l - c) and R1/(l - c). That is, we can write m e 
where 
v e 
v m 
a 
a R1 + (1 - a)R1 m e 
(1 - c) 
a R1 + (1 - a)R1 e m 
(1 - c)
c Be 
(1 - c) + c(l + n)Be 
Therefore, being an entrant is equivalent to receiving the gamble 
(R1,R1) with probability (a,l - a) year after year. Similarly, m e 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
being the monopolist is equivalent to receiving the gamble (R1,R1) m e 
with probabilities (1 - a,a) every year. 
The theorems of the abstract model can be interpreted 
in our setting. Equation (12) becomes (28). 
Corollary 1: 
TI - n X - X e m 
(1 - c)(n Ve + Vm) (28) 
Proof: 
This is an immediate corollary of theorem 1. It can also 
be derived from Theorem 2 by performing the required algebra. D 
Since all firms are treated the same, in the long run 
each is equally likely to be the monopolist; that is Y. = l/(n + 1)J 
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for every j. As well, due to the symmetric nature of the equilibrium, 
the surplus, S., is the same in every state. This, therefore, is J 
the special case discussed in section II where the surplus is 
definitely nonnegative every period. 
It was also suggested in section II that entry of more 
players into the game might drive the aggregate value of the game, and 
thus by (12) also the expected surplus, to zero. We can investigate 
this question in the specific model of this section. Incidentally, 
this question also suggests that we might formally define an entry 
equilibrium into the game. Since Ve is always positive (see the proof 
of Theorem 2) we must assume the existence of some fixed cost of 
entry into the game varying across firms to generate an entry 
equilibrium. Interpret this fixal cost as an organization cost. In this 
context we are asking if the surplus of TI over firms' expenditures goes 
to zero when fixed organization costs are low enough for enough firms. 
Corollary 2: 
As n goes to infinity, the symmetric equilibrium converges 
to the following: 
lim x 
n-+o  e 
0 (29) 
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s lim n x = 2 2 TI n-+oo e S - c(S - 1) 
(30) 
Proof: 
s - 1 lim x = 2 2 n-+oo m S - c(S ·� 1) 
TI 
Simply perform the required operations. 
The case where the monopolist has no advantage (S = 1) 
(31) 
0 
might be used as a base case. In this case, as n grows expenditures by 
any particular firm go to zero, but expenditures by the aggregate 
converge upwards to TI. That is, entry causes aggregate expenditures 
to converge to TI and the aggregate value of the game to 
converge to zero as hypothesized. However, the situation changes 
as the advantage to the monopolist grows. Expenditures by the 
current monopolist do not disappear in the limit. Furthermore, 
aggregate expenditures are less than TI. That is, even in the limit 
TI exceeds aggregate expenditures and the aggregate value of the game 
is positive. (It is possible to prove that Ve goes to 0 even in this 
case, however). Therefore, entry might not always caqse lobbying 
expenditures to equal TI even if fixed organization costs are low. 
The tendency for a positive surplus to persist in the limit is 
more pronounced when the current monopolist is given a larger 
advantage. 
The question of the g;eneral effect of the size of B 
on the surplus remains to be investigated. 
Corollary 3: 
(i) 
D x 3 2 2 e _ -n [(l - c)S + c] + ,2cn + n 
� - 2 
TI 
* 
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(32) 
(ii) 
Dx m 
Di3
(Sn + 1) (1 - c) (2n - (Sn + 1)) + c(n2 + 1) 
*2 
2 n TI (33) 
(iii) D no (nx + x ) µ e m 
2 2 2 (1 + Sn)2n(l - S) + c(2 + 2Sn + 2n S - 2Sn ) 
*2 
2 n TI 
(34) 
where 
Proof: 
* 2 2 2 (Sn + 1) - en (S - 1) - 2cn(S - 1)
Simply perform the required operations. 
The firm receives two conceptually different rewards from 
winning the franchise. In the short run, it receives the franchise 
profit that period. From a longer-run perspective, its expected 
(35) 
0 
return for the rest of the game is also increased due to the monopolist's 
advantage. Therefore increasing (3 increases the value of winning by
by increasing the long-run expected returns. Simply considering this 
factor might lead us to expect that increases in S should result in 
increases in expenditures of all firms. That is, an increased reward 
should induce increased efforts to obtain it. However, two factors 
complicate this. First, changing (3 also changes the marginal return 
of the monopolist's and entrants' expenditures. In particular, the 
entrants' chances of winning are decreased for any given expenditure. 
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This might induce them to spend less as S rises. Second, the firms 
may respond to any change in the others' expenditures. However, 
certainly as the future matters more (i.e. , c is larger), we might 
expect our initial hypothesis to be more applicable since the effect 
of increasing S on the value of winning becomes larger. 
The signs of Dxe/DS and Dxm/DS are somewhat reflective of 
this intuition. When c is a neighborhood of O, Dxe/DB is always 
negative. However, as c increases beyond this point, the sign becomes 
ambiguous. The reverse is true for Dxm/DB. When c is in a neighborhood 
of 1, its sign is positive; as c decreases beyond this point, the sign 
becomes ambiguous. Finallly, as n increases, an entrant's probability 
of winning goes to zero. Therefore, we would'expect the long-run 
factor to become unimportant and for the entrant to behave in a 
fashion similar to his behavior when c equals zero. This in fact 
occurs. It is easy to see that for every (6,c) there exists an n° 
such that 
n > o 
Dx 
n => e Di3 < o. (36) 
The sign of the derivative of total expenditure per period 
with respect to S, �B (nxe + xm)' behaves even more intuitively. First, 
as for previous cases, the derivative is more likely to be positive 
as c increases, thereby increasing the effect of the long-run factor. 
Corollary 4: 
Let o·(B,n) 
2 Sn (6 - 1) + Sn - n 
2 
Bn (S - 1) + Bn + 1 
(37) 
(i) 
< 0 < 
D(nx + x ) 
c = o <=> ;S 
m = o. 
> 0 > 
(ii) For every (6,n) � (l,00) x {l,2,3, ... } 
0 < o(B,n) < 1. 
(iii) DO 
DB > o, 
Do 
Dn > 0. 
Proof: 
Obvious. 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
0 
That is, for every (6,n) we can divide the interval [O,l] 
into two sections. If c is in the left section, expenditures fall 
(the surplus rises) as S rises; if c is in the right hand section, 
expenditures rise (the surplus falls) as S rises. Increasing S 
or increasing n moves this cutoff point to the right. Increasing 
B is initially more likely to cause a rise in expenditures; however, 
as it is continually increased it will eventually result in falls 
of total expenditures. The intuition behind the sign of Do/Dn is 
the same as used previously; as n increases, the probability of a 
given firm winning decreases and therefore tQe long-run effect 
matters less. 
Two other results in accord with the intuition of (iii) 
of Corollary 4 are: 
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Corollary 5: 
(i) For every (n,c) there exists a B0 such that 
o D B > B => DB (nxe + xm) < 0. 
(ii) For every (B,c) there exists an n° such that 
18 
(41) 
o D n > n => DB (nxe 
+ xm) < 0. (42) 
Proof: 
Obvious. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
D 
In general, the long-run expected surplus of the franchise 
profit over combined expenditures by the firms equals the long-run expected 
aggregate value of the game. Since the latter will generally be 
nonnegative, so is the former. If competitive pressures drive the 
latter to zero, the former is also zero. If in addition all firms 
are identical and the equilibrium is symmetric, we have Posner's 
assertion - combined expenditures by firms will precisely equal 
the franchise profit every period, However, there is some question 
as to whether we can reasonably expect competitive pressures to 
drive the aggregate value of the game to zero. In the simple 
example of section III, increases in the number of potential entrants 
does not eliminate a positive aggregate value of the game, even in 
the limit. This tendency becomes more pronounced as the advantage 
to the current monopolist is increased. In this model, differences 
in the advantage of the monopolist resu•lt in differing behavior. 
An increased advantage to the current monopolist tends to decrease 
(increase) aggregate expenditures if firms discount future profits 
highly (very little), if there are many (few) potential entrants, or 
if the current monopolist's advantage is already quite high (low). 
Possibilities exist for applying and testing this model in 
real situations. The regulatory process is generally characterized 
by periodic review and (possible) reassignment of the franchise. 
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Firms are often required to report their expenditures associated with 
participation in this process. The franchise profit is also public 
information. Other phenomena may also be investigated with variants 
of this model. Many political processes fit very naturally into 
this framework. For example, political parties battling for electoral 
success over an infinite horizon of ten desire to win a particular 
election not only because of the immediate reward but also because 
their chances of winning subsequent elections are increased. The 
same type of reasoning applies to presidential candidates competing 
in a succession of primaries to win their party's nomination. I 
am currently working on these applications. 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
The value functions must all satisfy 
n vij 1 Ri. + c. Z 8k.V.k. J l k=l J l 
Therefore 
n 
z y .V 
j=l J ij
n 
Z y .Rl 
j=l J ij 
+ c. � ( � Y.t\.]v.k l k=l j=l J .J l 
n 
Z Y.R�. + c. 
n 
z y V 
k=l k ik' j=l J lJ l 
The last step is by (7) . Now reorganize. 
n n 
(1 - c.) Z y.V .. l j=l J l] 
Summing over i yields 
n n 
Z Z (1 - c.) Y.V ..
i=l j=l l J lJ 
Substitute (8) into (A -5). 
n n 
Z Z (1 - c.)y.V .. 
i=l j=l l J lJ 
z 
j=l 
1 YJ.
R . . •l] 
n 
z 
j=l 
yj [ �  R�.1 . i=l lJ. 
� y. [ � 8 .. TI - X�.J. 
j=l J i=l lJ lJ 
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(A -1) 
(A -2) 
(A -3) 
(A -4) 
(A -5 ) 
(A -6) 
Then by (1) we have 
n n 
l: l: (1 - c.) y.V .. 
i=l j=l i ] lJ 
Proof of Theorem 2: 
n 
L: y. (1T 
j=l ] 
n 
j:l 
yjsj. 
n 
L: x�.) 
i=l lJ 
For {x�}�
+l
l to be an equilibrium, it is necessary and J J= 
(A -7) 
(A -8) 
D 
sufficient that x� is an optimal strategy for firm i when it takes 
J 
the others' strategies as given. A necessary and sufficient con-
2L 
dition for this latter event to hold is that the relevant functional 
equation of dynamic programming be satisfied [Denardo, 1967]. 
Choose an arbitrary firm i. Fix the other firms strategies 
at {xj }j,l.i" Then define (n + 1) real valued functions of a real 
variable. 
First for i f j, let a .. belJ 
Sx�. + x + L: xk . ' Sx�. + x + L: xk. f 0 JJ kfi J JJ k# J 
aij (x) = � 
Then for i j, let a .. be lJ 
kf j 
1, 
kfj 
Sx�. + x + L: �- _ 0 JJ kfi J -
kf j 
(A -9a) 
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kf i kf i i 
aii_(x) = 
�Bx + I xf , Bx + Z °'{· ' C 
(A -9b) 
1, Sx + L: x�. = 0 
kf i ;L 
Now define (n + 1) real valued functions over Rn+2. 
gij (x,yl
, · · · ,yn+l) 
_x_ ex 
cSx�. 
a .. (x) 1T - x + - y . + 
__ll_ 
lJ Cl· • ( x) i a (x) Y • � � J 
ex"( 
+ L: __ lsi__ 
kfi aij (x) 
yk' j f i 
kfj 
ex* � c� � 
(A -10) 
--- 1T- x + --- y + L: ---y a .. (x) a .. (x) i k.J.. a .. (x) k' lJ l] ;-l lJ 
j 
Then a nonnegative xt is optimal for firm i given the others' 
behavior if and only if there exist n + 1 real numbers (Vi1, . . .  , 
V. +l) such that (A -11) and (A -12) are satisfied. Furthermore, i,n 
V .. is the value of the game to firm i at state j.lJ 
v . . lJ sup giJ.(x, v.l, .. . ,V. ) xE[O,oo) i i,n+l 
for every j = 1, . . .  , n + 1. 
(A -11) 
g .. (x� . •  v.1
, . • •  ,v. +l) l.J l.J i i ,n 
for every j 1, ... ,n + 1. 
sup g
iJ.(x,V.l
, . . •  ,V ) 
xE[O,oo) 
l. i,n+l 
To prove existence, it is therefore sufficient to 
substitute the following 
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�j = 
{ Xe' k f j (A -13) 
xm' k 
= j 
vij 
{ Ve, i 
vm' i 
f j 
(A -14) 
j 
into (A -11) and (A -12) and verify that (A -11) and (A -12) are true. 
Since the selection of i was arbitrary, verification of optimality 
for one i is sufficient to guarantee optimality for all i's. This 
is straightforward. (A t least conceptually if not algebraically!) 
However, we do not obtain uniqueness in this fasion. A s  well, 
such a method gives no idea how I choose the values for x .. and 
l.J 
vij. Therefore, instead, I shall outline a more constructive proof. 
A nonnegative strategy (xe,xm) with associated values 
(V ,V ) is a symmetric equilibrium if and only if (A -11) and (A -12) e m 
are satisfied. We can rewrite (A -11) and (A -12) in simplier form 
because the strategies are so simple. Let 
a
e
(x) = 
am(x) = 
�Bx + x + (n - l)x , Sx + x + (n - l)x j 0 m e m e 
1, Bx
m 
+ x + (n - l)xe = 0 
�Bx + nx , Bx + nx 1 0 e e 
1, Bx + nxe = 0 
Then rewrite (A -10) as 
x ex c(Bxm + (n - l)xe) ge(x,ye,ym) = a (x) TI - x + a (x) Ym + a (x) Ye e e e 
en x 
(x ) - � TI - x + � + __ e gm ,ye,ym a (x) a (x) ym a (x) Ye·m m m 
Then (A -11) and (A -12) become 
v e ge(xe,Ve,Vm) 
Vm = gm(xm,Ve,Vm) 
ge(xe,Ve,Vm
) sup ge(x,V ,V ) 
xE[O,oo) e m 
gm = (xm,Ve,Vm) sup xE[O,oo) 
gm(x,Ve
,Vm). 
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(A -lSa) 
(A -lSb) 
(A -16a) 
(A -16b) 
(A -17) 
(A -18) 
(A -19) 
(A -20) 
That is, a nonnegative pair (xe,
xm) is a symmetric equilibrium if 
and only if there exist numbers Ve and Vm such that (A -17) through 
26 
(A-20) are satisfied.* 
We thus have four equations in four unknowns -- xe, xm, 
Ve and Vm. Proving the theorem now amounts to proving the existence 
and uniqueness of a solution to these equations. 
First, I will show that the solution to xe and xm is 
necessarily interior; both x
e 
and xm are positive. This will 
allow me to use the necessary conditions for an interior extremum. 
Suppose that both xe and xm equal 0. Then (A-17) and (A-18) become 
v = 0 e 
v = 0 m 
Then (A-19) and (A-20) are both the same equation. 
0 sup 
xE[O,oo) 
{11 - x, 
0, 
x ,,. 0 
x = 0 
Equation (A-23) i� of course, not true. Therefore, both xe and 
(A-21) 
(A-22) 
(A-23) 
xm cannot be zero. Suppose that xe equals 0. Then (A-17) and (A-18) 
require that Ve be 0 and Vm be (11 - xm)/(l - c). Then (A-20) 
becomes 
*Technically, for the "only if" to be true, we must prove that V .. l_J 
will only assume two values for firm i under (A-13), one for when 
i is the entrant and one for where i is the monopolist. This is 
easily seen to be true by using the direct definition of the value 
function (10). 
11 - x m 
-r-:-c = 
c 
1 - c m 
sup 
{ 11 - x + -- (11 - x ) , x -:f 0 
xE[O,oo) �-c� (11 - x ) x = 0 1 - c m ' 
(A-24) 
This clearly is only true if xm 0. (Otherwise choosing x < xm 
yields a supremum larger than 11 - xm/(l - c).) Therefore xm must 
27 
be zero as well which cannot be by previous considerations. Similarly, 
we derive a contradiction if we assume xm equals 0. 
Therefore, the first order conditions for an interior 
maximum are necessary for (A-19) and (A-20) to be true. If we 
differentiate ge and gm with respect to x twice we find a sufficient 
condition for both to be strictly concave in x is V > V • Itm- e 
is easy to prove that this is in fact the case� From (A-19) 
we have that 
Ve� g(O,Ve,Vm) 
cV e 
Since 0 < c < 1, Ve must be nonnegative. Then by (A-20), 
Vm � g(O,Ve,Vm) 
cV e 
Since Ve is nonnegative, Vm � Ve. 
Therefore, we can replace (A-19) and (A-20) by the 
necessary conditions for an interior maximum. They become, 
(A-25) 
(A-26) 
(A-27) 
(A -28) 
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respectively, (A-29) and (A-30). Note that ae(xe) equals am(xm). 
We will simply write a for this function of xm and xe
. 
2 - (Sx + (n - l)x )n a 
v - v = m e c(Sx + (n - l)x ) 
(A-29) 
m e 
2a 
v - v = m e 
m e 
- Sn x e " 
c Sn x e 
(A-30) 
By equating the RHS of (A-29) and (A-30), it is now easy to prove 
that any pair (xe,xm) satisfies (A-29) and (A-30) only if
x m [ n - 1
) 
n - -S-
xe 
(A-31) 
That is, the RHS of (A-29) equals the RHS of (A-30) if and only if 
(A-31) is true. 
Taking stock for a moment, we now have that (xe,xm
,Ve,Vm
) 
is a solution to our original equations if and only if (A-17),. 
(A-18), (A-30) and (A-31) are satisfied. By algebraic manipulation, 
(A-17) and (A-18) can be seen to imply that 
v m v e 
(Sxm - xe)n + 
a(xe - xm) 
a - c(Sx - x ) m e 
Therefore, any xe and xm which are part of the solution must 
satisfy 
(Sxm - xe)n + a(xe - xm) 
a - c(Sxm - xe) 
a2 - Sn x " 
e 
c Sn xe 
(A-32) 
(A-33) 
In fact, (xe,xm
) is a symmetric equilibrium if and only
if (A-33) and (A-31) are satisfied. This is clearly necessary. 
To see sufficiency, suppose that (xe'�m) does satisfy (A-33) and 
(A-31). Then since (A-17) and (A-18) are two linear equations in 
Ve and Vm' we can always find a solution for Ve and Vm which 
satisfies (A-17) and (A-18). Then since the solution satisfies 
(A-32) and since (xe,xm) satisfy (A-33), we know that (A-30) is 
satisfied as well. 
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There is precisely one solution to (A-33) and (A-31). It is 
x 
e 
x m 
Snn 
( Sn+ 1) 
2 - cn2 (S
( n - l] n - -S- xe 
2 1) - 2cn(S - 1)
It is easy to verify that both numbers are positive. Now we 
(A-34) 
(A-35) 
simply substitute these back into (A-17) and (A-18) to determine 
Ve and Vm. Equations (A-17) and (A-18) can be viewed as two 
linear equations in two unknowns -- Ve and Vm. The determinant 
turns out to be nonzero and so there is precisely one solution, 
that given in the statement of Theorem 2. D 
